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I. INTRODUCTION
Lora Lohr "might not be alive today" if it were not for her pacemak-
er.' Her Medtronic pacemaker allowed her to have an active and
healthy lifestyle despite her irregular heart condition.2 That is, until one
fateful day in December 1990 when her pacemaker lead3 failed, alleged-
ly causing "complete heart block" requiring "emergency surgery and re-
placement of her pacemaker."4 In 1993, Lohr and her husband filed a
civil suit in Florida state court.' They averred, in part, a negligence
count alleging that Medtronic breached its "duty to use reasonable care
in the design, manufacture, assembly, and sale of the subject pacemak-
er."' Medtronic removed the action to the federal district court and
moved for summary judgment.! The district court eventually held that
the Lohrs' causes of action were federally pre-empted and dismissed the
entire action.' Amongst an uncertain legal landscape, the Lohrs would
1. See Brief for Petitioner Medtronic, Inc. at 24, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S.
Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), available in 1996 WL 88789 [hereinafter Brief
for Petitioner].
2. See generally id. at 35.
3. See Brief for Cross-Petitioners Lora Lohr & Michael Lohr at 8, Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996) (Nos. 95-754, 95-886), available in 1996 WL 88460
[hereinafter Brief for Cross-Petitioners]. The lead delivers the electronic stimulus gen-
erated by the pacemaker to the heart, thus steadying the heartbeat. See id. at 7.
Medtronic, Inc. reports over $1.7 billion in revenue from pacemakers, leads, and ac-
cessories, representing nearly a 50% market share. See MEDTRONIC, INC. 1995 ANNUAL
SHAREHOLDERS REPORT 4, 6 (1996).
4. See Brief for Cross-Petitioners, supra note 3, at 8.
5. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2248 (1996).
6. Id. (citations omitted).
7. See id.
8. See id. at 2249. The district court initially denied Medtronic's motion for sum-
mary judgment, but subsequently granted the motion on reconsideration in light of
Duncan v. lolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994). See id.
fight their case in the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit9 and fi-
nally before the Supreme Court of the United States. °
The parties' conflicting interests highlight the importance of the Su-
preme Court's decision. For Mrs. Lohr and numerous consumers who
rely on medical devices, federal pre-emption means that they bear the
risk and cost of any subsequent injury resulting from the
manufacturer's negligent acts or unreasonably dangerous defective
product." For Medtronic, Inc. and other similarly situated medical de-
vice manufacturers, numerous state tort actions could mean financial
disaster, 2 or discourage future medical product research and develop-
ment projects."
This Note will explore the historical, judicial, and social ramifications
of the Court's decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr. Part 114 describes
the history of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938
(FDCA)," the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA)," federal
9. Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995), affd in part and rev'd
in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
10. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. 2240. The Court noted that the courts of appeals were
divided over the extent pre-emption affected common law claims under the Medical
Device Amendments. See id. at 2250 n.6. Compare English v. Mentor Corp., 67 F.3d
477 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding pre-emption), and Lohr, 56 F.3d 1335 (finding pre-emp-
tion), with Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding no pre-emp-
tion), Michael v. Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995) (finding no pre-emption),
and Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding no pre-emption).
11. See, e.g., Griffin v. Medtronic, Inc., 82 F.3d 79 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. granted,
vacated, and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 939 (1997) (remanding case in light of the Su-
preme Court's Medtronic decision).
12. See Gina Kolata, Details of Implant Settlement Announced by Federal Judge,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1994, at A16 (reporting $3.7 billion class-action settlement against
three silicon breast implant manufacturers); see also Marcia Angell, Shattuck Lec-
ture-Evaluating the Health Risks of Breast Implants: The Interplay of Medical Sci-
ence, the Law, and Public Opinion, 334 N. ENG. J. MED. 1513, 1517 (1996) (noting
that following the $4.2 billion settlement and over 20,000 individual lawsuits filed
against them, Dow Coming, a major manufacturer of breast implants, was forced to
file for bankruptcy protection) (citing Jay Mathews, Breast Implant Maker Files for
Bankruptcy, WASH. POST, May 16, 1995, at Al).
13. See David M. Henry, Pre-emption in Medtronic Pits MDA's Consumer Protec-
tion Purposes Against Goal of Encouraging Development of Medical Devices, WEST'S
LEGAL NEWS, May 23, 1996, available in 1996 WL 272691 (noting that the issue of
pre-emption depends on balancing two competing interests-compensating an injured
plaintiff and promoting medical device development-and may lean in favor of the
medical devices industry).
14. See infra notes 21-147 and accompanying text.
15. Ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395
(1994)).
16. Pub. L. No. 94-295, § l(a), 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
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pre-emption in general, and federal pre-emption under the MDA. Part
]E 1 7 presents the facts and judicial history of the case. In Part IV,
this Note critically analyzes Justice Stevens's plurality opinion and the
concurring and dissenting opinions. Part V9 discusses the judicial and
social impacts of the case with particular attention to the implication
for the biotechnology and medical device industries. Part VI con-
cludes by observing that various public policy concerns permeate the
Court's pre-emption analysis and may signal a new approach for judicial
decisionmaldng.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
At issue in Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr2 was whether the Medical Device
Amendments of 1976 (MDA)' "pre-empts a state common-law negli-
gence action against the manufacturer of an allegedly defective medical
device."' The Supreme Court, in reaching its decision in Medtronic,
necessarily required a thorough understanding of the historical devel-
opment of food, drug, and medical device regulation in America as
juxtiposed against the federal pre-emption doctrine.
A. A Brief History of Federal Regulation of Foods, Drugs & Medical
Devices
1. The Pure Food and Drugs Act of 1906
In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act (1906 Act),'
venturing for the first time to regulate the manufacture and distribution
of drugs. 5 Among its prohibitions, the 1906 Act banned the manufac-
ture and distribution of adulterated or misbranded food and drugs, and
17. See infra notes 148-55 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 156-97 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 198-259 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
21. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
22. Pub. L. No. 94-295, § l(a), 90 Stat. 539 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tion of 21 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.).
23. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245.
24. Ch. 3915, 34 Stat. 768 (1906), repealed by Federal Drug and Cosmetic Act of
1938, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1938).
25. See Dennis R. Johnson, The History of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act
and the Meat Inspection Act, 37 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 5, 5 (1982).
the false or misleading labeling of food and drugs.26 The 1906 Act vest-
ed enforcement in the Bureau of Chemistry (Bureau) an early forerun-
ner of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).27 The Bureau had lim-
ited enforcement power, however, in that it could only seize non-con-
forming goods and press criminal charges after goods were already on
the market."
The Pure Food and Drugs Act's post-marketing regulatory scheme
lacked many of the elements necessary to be effective." First, rather
than providing proactive protection, the 1906 Act operated only in re-
sponse to a violation.3" Manufacturers were not required to test their
product prior to distribution, nor could the Bureau take any action until
the product entered the stream of commerce.3 Second, the 1906 Act
only prohibited false statements about the identity or composition ofdrugs, not false statements as to the therapeutic effects of the drugs.2
Finally, the 1906 Act failed to cover medical devices.3 Despite Con-
gress amending the Pure Food and Drug Act on several occasions,'
the 1906 Act still lacked the essential conceptual framework of an effec-
tive and progressive regulatory process.35
26. See id. at 6.
27. See Michael Brannon, Organizing and Reorganizing the FDA, in FOOD AND
DRUG LAW 113, 115 (Richard M. Cooper ed., 1991).
28. See id.
29. See Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the Regulation of Prescrip-
tion Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Re-
form, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 883, 890-92 (1996) (discussing the existing federal regulato-
ry scheme under the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the potential for privat-
ization of certain aspects of drug and medical device regulation, and the need for
products liability reform).
30. See Brannon, supra note 27, at 115.
31. See Julie C. Relihan, Expediting FDA Approval of AIDS Drugs: An Internation-
al Approach, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 229, 234 (1995).
32. See United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488, 496-97 (1911) (holding that the
Pure Food and Drugs Act only prohibited false statements as to the identity of the
drug).
33. See Rodney R. Munsey & Frank E. Samuel, Jr., Medical Device Regulation, In
Transition, in SEVENTY-FIHI- ANNIVERSARY COMMEMORATIVE VOLUME OF FOOD AND
DRUG LAw 350, 351 (Food and Drug Law Inst. ed., 1984).
34. See H.R. REP. No. 62-1138 (1912) (failed attempt to legislatively overturn the
restrictions placed on enforcement in United States v. Johnson, 221 U.S. 488 (1911)).
35. See David F. Cavers, The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938: Its Legisla-
tive History and Its Substantive Provisions, 6 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 2, 20 (1939)
(tracing the historical context giving rise to the adoption of the FDCA of 1938);
Myron L. Marlin, Treatment INDs: A Faster Route to Drug Approval?, 39 AM. U. L.
REV. 171, 177 (1989).
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2. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938
For twenty-two years Congress struggled to find an effective regulato-
ry system,36 but no substantial change arose until public sentiment
forced Congress to revamp federal food and drug regulations.37 In
1937, public outrage reached a pinnacle when more than one hundred
people tragically died from consuming Elixir Sulfanilamide, a drug nev-
er tested by its manufacturer prior to being sold.' In response to the
Elixir Sulfanilanide incidents, Congress passed the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act of 1938 (FDCA).' The FDCA required all new drugs
to be tested by their manufacturers and reviewed by the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA) prior to being marketed.4"
The FDCA addressed many of the areas lacking in its predecessor,
the Pure Food and Drug Act. First, the FDCA was proactive rather than
reactive.4' Before a drug could be put on the market, the FDCA re-
quired a manufacturer to fie a New Drug Application (NDA).42 The
NDA solicited medical and scientific information about the safety of the
36. See Wallace F. Janssen, The U.S. Food and Drug Law: How It Came; How It
Works, 35 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 132, 132-36 (1980) (providing a brief account of the
events leading to the adoption of the FDCA of 1938).
37. See id. at 135-36.
38. See id.; see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 29, at 893 & n.21 (citing REPORT
OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ON DEATHs DUE TO ELIXR SULFANILAMIDE, S. Doc.
No. 75-124, at 1-3 (1937)).
39. Ch. 675, § 1, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (current version at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-395
(1994)).
40. See id. § 505(a), 52 Stat. at 1052 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a)
(1994)). The FDCA originally defined a new drug as:
(1) [a]ny drug the composition of which is such that such drug is not gener-
ally recognized, among experts qualified by scientific training and experience
to evaluate the safety of drugs, as safe for use under the conditions pre-
scribed, recommended or suggested in the labeling thereof, . . . ; or (2) [a]ny
drug the composition of which is such that such drug, as a result of investi-
gations to determine its safety for use under such conditions, has become so
recognized, but which has not, otherwise than in such investigations, been
used to a material extent or for a material time under such conditions.
See id. § 201, 52 Stat. at 1041-42 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321 (1994)).
41. See Janssen, supra note 36, at 136-37.
42. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 505(a), 52 Stat. at 1052
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (1994)); see also Walsh & Pyrich, supra note
29, at 894-95.
drug for review by the FDA." If the FDA found that the NDA provided
insufficient information, the drug could not be sold."
Second, the FDCA expanded the enforcement powers of the FDA to
include the authority to inspect drug manufacturing facilities and seek
court injunctions.46 This added to the FDA's previous powers which
included the authority to seize tainted products and pursue criminal
prosecutions.46
Third, the FDCA also covered medical devices.47 Although not as
extensive in scope as the drug regulations, the FDCA's medical devices
regulations prohibited manufacturers from distributing misbranded or
adulterated medical devices in the market and placed restrictions on
medical device labeling.48 Yet, in its original form, the FDCA created
only reactive protection for consumers of medical devices.46 While the
FDCA's drug provisions provided revolutionary premarket testing, med-
ical devices could only be controlled after reaching the market.'
43. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 29, at 894-95.
44. See id. Prior to 1962, if the FDA did not request additional information within
a set period of time, the NDA would automatically become effective and the manu-
facture could begin marketing the product. See Note, FDA Reform and the European
Medicines Evaluation Agency, 108 HARv. L. REV. 2009, 2012 (1995).
45. See Janssen, supra note 36, at 136.
46. See id.
47. See id. The FDCA originally defined medical devices as "instruments, apparatus,
and contrivances, including their components, parts and' accessories, intended (1) for
use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or
other animals; or (2) to affect the structure or any function of the body of man or
other animals." Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, ch. 675, § 201(h), 52 Stat. at 1040,
1041 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (1994)); see Munsey & Samuel, supra
note 33, at 351; Gary E. Gamerman, Note, Intended Use and Medical Devices: Distin-
guishing Nonmedical "Devices" from Medical "Devices" Under 21 U.S.C. § 321(h), 61
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 806, 816-20 (1993).
48. See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, § 201(n), 52 Stat. at 1041
(current version at 21 U.S.C. § 321(n) (1994)); see also Robert B. Leflar, Public Ac-
countability and Medical Device Regulation, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 6 (1989).
49. See Leflar, supra note 48, at 6; Munsey & Samuel, supra note 33, at 351;
G'amerman, supra note 47, at 820.
50. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 29, at 895.
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3. The Medical Device Amendments of 1976
Since 1938, Congress has amended the FDCA over twenty times."1
Not until 1976, however, did Congress address perceived shortcomings
of the FDCA in regulating medical devices by enacting the Medical
Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA).52 Specifically, Congress desired to
protect consumers from "increasingly complex devices which pose[d]
serious risk if inadequately tested or improperly designed or used,"'
without, however, stifling medical innovation.' Realizing the unique
attributes of the medical devices industry,55 Congress rejected merely
extending the same regulations applied to drug manufacturers and in-
51. See PETER BARTON HUTrr & RICHARD A. MERRILL, FOOD AND DRUG LAW 13 (2d
ed. 1991) (noting that the general trend in the amendments was to expand the cover-
age and increase the substantive authority granted to the FDA). Between 1938 and
1962, three amendments significantly altered the character of the regulatory scheme
under the FDCA. the Food Additives Amendment of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-929, § 1, 72
Stat. 1784 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); the Color Addi-
tive Amendments of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-618, 74 Stat. 397 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.); and the Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-
781, § 1, 76 Stat. 780 (1962). See id. The Drug Amendments of 1962 again represent-
ed a response to public tragedy. See Janssen, supra note 36, at 137. Researchers had
discovered a link between the use of thalidomide (a drug used to relieve morning
sickness) and serious birth defects. See id. The 1962 Amendments expanded the
FDA's role by requiring a premarket determination that all drugs were safe and ef-
fective for their intended purpose. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994). Further, drug manu-
facturers were prohibited from conducting human clinical tests without prior FDA ap-
proval. See id.
52. Pub. L. No. 94-295, § l(a), 90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C.) (stating that the purpose of the
amendments is "to provide for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intend-
ed for human use").
53. S. REP. No. 94-33, at 5 (1975), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1075.
54. See id. at 2.
55. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 12 (1976); see also King v. Collagen Corp., 983
F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir. 1993) (Aldrich, J., concurring) (citing the legislative history
of the MDA and noting that Congress intended to provide protection to users of med-
ical devices and encourage research).
The legislative history . . . shows the principal emphasis to be on the protec-
tion of the individual user. But it also shows the intent to "encourage . . .
research and development" and "permit new and improved devices to be
marketed without delay." Perfection is impossible and a few individuals may
be denied full protection at the cost of benefiting the rest.
Id. (Aldrich, J., concurring) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2, 14, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1071, 1083).
stead created a flexible system dependent on the risks and benefits of
the device. 6
The MDA classifies devices into three categories based on the
device's risk to the public.57 Class I devices pose "no unreasonable risk
of illness or injury... and are subject only to minimal regulation by
'general controls."" . Class II devices pose a "potentially more harmful"
risk to the public and "must comply with federal performance regula-
tions known as 'special controls."'59 Class III devices "'present a poten-
tial[ly] unreasonable risk of illness or injury' or... are 'purported or
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or
for a use which is of substantial importance in preventing impairment
of human health."'" Prior to distribution to consumers, class III devic-
es must undergo an extensive premarket approval (PMA) process ad-
ministered by the FDA.6"
The FDA, however, does not require all Class III devices to pass
premarket approval.6 The MDA provides for two key exceptions: (1)
pre-1976 devices pending FDA approval (i.e., "grandfathered" devic-
es),' and (2) devices that are "substantially equivalent" to pre-existing
devices.' Under the "grandfathered" exception, any device, including
56. See H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 12. The House elaborated:
[T]he Committee has developed a balanced regulatory proposal intended to
assure that the public is protected from unsafe and ineffective medical devic-
es, that health professionals have more confidence in the devices they use or
prescribe, and that innovations in medical device technology are not stifled
by unnecessary restrictions. [The bill] . . . would prohibit . . . the marketing
of a new device until the safety and effectiveness of the device has been
established .... [The bill] reflects the need to develop innovative new de-
vices, consistent with the need to protect the subjects of device research.
Id.
57. See 21 U.S.C. § 360a (1994); see generally Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 29, at
918-21 (describing the classification system of medical devices under the MDA).
58. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246 (1996) (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 360c(a)(1)(A) (1994)). Examples of Class I devices include tongue depressors and
Band-Aids. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A).
59. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B)). Examples of
Class II devices include oxygen masks and tampons. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(B).
60. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C)). Class I de-
vices include pacemakers (at issue in Medtronic), breast implants, and intrauterine
contraceptive devices. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C).
61. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246-47 (noting that the FDA spends an average
of 1200 hours reviewing each Class III application during the premarket approval
(PMA) process).
62. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A).
64. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(B).
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Class III devices, on the market prior to the effective date of the MDA
need not undergo premarket approval.' Under the "substantially equiv-
alent" exception, a medical device marketed after the MDA's effective
date avoids the rigorous premarket approval process if the device is
"substantially equivalent" to either a Class III "grandfathered" device or
any Class I or Class II device.'
Devices qualifying under either exception need only comply with the
less rigorous FDA premarket notification approval (PNA) re-
quirements." Significantly, under the premarket notification process,
the FDA does not evaluate the device's safety or effectiveness.' Rath-
er, the FDA inquiry merely determines whether or not the device in
question is "substantially equivalent" to a pre-existing device.' Some
commentators contend that exempting devices from the more thorough
review of the premarket approval process has become the rule rather
than the exception.'0
65. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A); 21 C.F.R. § 814.1(c) (1) (1997). Medical devices
qualifying under this exception avoid premarket FDA scrutiny for 30 months after the
FDA classifies the device in Class in, or 90 days after the FDA calls for premarket
approval applications for the particular type of device. See 21 U.S.C. § 351(f)(2)(B)
(1994); 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b).
66. See 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(1)(A), 360e(b)(1)(B); see also Jonathan S. Kahan,
Premarket Approval Versus Premarket Notification: Different Routes to the Same
Market, 39 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 510, 515-18 (1984) (noting the less stringent
premarket notification requirements under the "substantially equivalent" exception).
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 360e(b)(1)(A)-(B).
68. Compare 21 C.F.R. § 814.45(c) (describing premarket approval process), with
21 C.F.R. § 807.100(b) (describing the premarket notification process). Congressional
investigation has quantified this disparate level of scrutiny noting that the FDA
spends an average of 1200 hours reviewing a Class M application during the PMA
process while spending only 20 hours during premarket notification approval (PNA)
process. Medtronic Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2246-47 (1996) (citing Medical Devic-
es and Drug Issues: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Health & the Environ. of
the House Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 384 (1987) (statement of
James S. Benson, Deputy Director of the Center for Devices and Radiological
Health)); Kahan, supra note 66, at 512-14.
69. See 21 C.F.R. § 807.100(b).
70. See Robert Adler, The 1976 Medical Device Amendments: A Step in the Right
Direction Needs Another Step in the Right Direction, 43 FOOD DRUG COSM. LJ. 511
(1988); Lawrence S. Makow, Note, Medical Device Review at the Food and Drug
Administration: Lessons From Magnetic Resonance Spectroscopy and Biliary Litho-
tripsy, 46 STAN. L. REv. 709 (1994) (noting that exemption is faster and more com-
mon).
Overall, the MDA represents an elaborate regulatory system protect-
ing consumers nation-wide from potentially life-threatening medical
devices while balancing the unique concerns of the medical device in-
dustry.71
B. General Overview of Federal Pre-emption
In crafting a comprehensive regulatory scheme governing the medical
device industry, Congress desired to establish a single standard for
71. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130, 1138 (1st Cir. 1993) (Aldrich, J.,
concurring); see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the pur-
pose of the MDA). Cf. Anne-Marie Dega, Comment, The Battle Over Medical Device
Regulation: Do the Federal Medical Device Amendments Preempt State Tort Law
Claims?, 27 LOy. U. Cm. L.J. 615, 622-25 (1996). After reviewing the legislative histo-
ry, Dega concludes that "the primary goal of the [MDA] remain[s] to protect public
health and safety." Id. at 625. Compare United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784,
798 (1969) ("[Tlhe Act's overriding purpose [is] to protect the public health."), with
United States v. Diapulse Corp., 457 F.2d 25, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1972) (explaining that the
primary purpose of the FDCA, of which the MDA is a part, is to protect the public
from unsafe products and "the safeguarding of the public health by enforcement of
certain standards of purity and effectiveness"). However, the Bacto-Unidisk and
Diapulse Corp. decisions pre-date the adoption of the MDA in 1976 and thus cannot
stand for the proposition that the "primary goal" of the MDA is to protect public
health and safety. Furthermore, a careful reading of the cited cases indicates that the
courts' use of the words "the Act" referred to the FDCA and the legislative history of
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, not the Medical Device Amendments of
1976. In Bacto-Unidisk, the Court stated:
But we are all the more convinced that we must give effect to congressional
intent in view of the well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such as
the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction con-
sistent with the Act's overriding purpose to protect the public health, and
specifically, § 507's purpose to ensure that antibiotic products marketed serve
the public with "efficacy" and "safety."
Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. at 798 (emphasis added).
Finally, Dega mischaracterizes Justice Aldrich's concurrence in King, the only
post-MDA authority cited above the district court level. Read in its proper context,
Justice Aldrich indicated that the legislative history points to a balanced consideration
of protection of the individual user versus protection of society as a whole. See
King, 983 F.2d at 1138 (citing S. REP. No. 94-33, at 2, 6, 14 (1975), reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1071, 1075, 1083). Justice Aldrich stated:
Concededly, the U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 94th Con-
gress, Second Session, Vol. 3, pp. 1070 et seq., Medical Device Amendments
of 1976, shows the principal emphasis to be on the protection of the individ-
ual user. But it also shows the intent to "encourage ... research and devel-
opment" and '!permit new and improved devices to be marketed without
delay." Perfection is impossible and a few individuals may be denied full
protection at the cost of benefitting the rest.
King, 983 F.2d at 1138 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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ensuring the safety of medical devices.7 Also desiring to relieve the in-
dustry of burdensome state regulatory requirements, Congress turned to
the doctrine of federal pre-emption.'
Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, "the
Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."'
Accordingly, the laws Congress enacts necessarily supersede state stat-
utes75 or local ordinances. 6 Under certain circumstances, federal laws
also can pre-empt state common-law actions.7 However, courts scruti-
nize federal legislation to ensure that Congress evinced a "clear and
manifest" intent to pre-empt state common-law actions.8
72. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the purpose of the
MDA).
73. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994); see also infra note 126 (providing the complete
text of § 360k).
74. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Consti-
tution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
75. See, e.g., Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988) (holding
that a state statute regulating issuance of long-term securities of natural gas pipeline
companies was pre-empted by federal Natural Gas Act); Michigan Canners & Freezers
Ass'n v. Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 478 (1984) (holding that a
state agricultural marketing statute was pre-empted by federal Agricultural Fair Prac-
tices Act).
76. See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 640
(1973) (stating that a municipal airport curfew was pre-empted by FAA regulation).
77. See, e.g., International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 500 (1987) (holding
that private nuisance action against out-of-state polluters was pre-empted by federal
Clean Water Act); Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 582-84 (1981) (holding
calculation of damages under state contract doctrines was pre-empted by Natural Gas
Act); Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 331-32
(1981) (holding that state tort claim based on abandonment of services was pre-
empted by Interstate Commerce Act); Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n
of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 270-73 (1974) (holding that state-law libel
claims were pre-empted by National Labor Relations Act); Sperry v. Florida ex rel.
Fla. Bar, 373 U.S. 379, 385 (1963) (holding that state enforcement of licensing re-
quirements was pre-empted by federal determination); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959) (holding that state tort-law action against labor
union for unfair labor practice was pre-empted by National Labor Relations Act).
78. See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (finding state po-
lice powers not pre-empted by federal acts absent a "clear and manifest" intent from
Congress).
A court can find the requisite congressional intent in three general
scenarios.'9 First, Congress may expressly intend to pre-empt state law
as evidenced by the actual language of the statute (i.e., "express" pre-
emption).' Second, Congress may enact a regulatory scheme so perva-
sive as to displace all forms of state regulation in the same field (i.e.,
"federal occupation-of-the-field" pre-emption)."' Third, Congress may
enact a federal law to achieve a particular objective that would be pro-
hibited, impaired, or frustrated by the enforcement of a conflicting state
law (i.e., "actual conflict" pre-emption).,2
1. Express Pre-emption
Congress must provide specific statutory language reflecting a "clear
and manifest" intent to pre-empt when it intends to pre-empt a state
regulation within a particular realmY For instance, in Rice v. Santa Fe
Elevator Corp.,' the Supreme Court held that the United States Ware-
house Act (Warehouse Act)85 pre-empted the enforcement of Illinois
laws against federally licensed warehouse operators.' The Court fo-
cused on a 1931 amendment to the Warehouse Act. Although the Ware-
79. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983) (listing various ways in which pre-emption may
occur).
80. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203; see infra notes 83-98 and accom-
panying text (discussing express pre-emption).
81. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 203-04; see infra notes 99-101 and
accompanying text (discussing federal occupation of the field pre-emption).
82. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 461 U.S. at 204. See generally Elaine M. Martin,
Note, The Burger Court and Pre-emption Doctrine: Federalism in the Balance, 60
NOTRE D.ME L. REV. 1233, 1235-36 (1985) (distinguishing express, conflict, and occu-
pation-of-the-field pre-emption). But see Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)
(commenting that "none of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test
or an exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can be no one
crystal clear distinctly marked formula").
83. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 230 (citing Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S.
605, 611 (1926); Allen-Bradley Local v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 315 U.S.
740, 749 (1942)) ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of
the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear
and manifest purpose of Congress."); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 106-08 (1983) (holding that state disability benefits law was not pre-empted by
ERISA); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (discussing ex-
press congressional intent); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324-25 (1966)
(stating Fifteenth Amendment language specific enough); Exxon Corp. v. City of New
York, 548 F.2d 1088, 1091 (2d Cir. 1977) (finding explicit pre-emption language).
84. 331 U.S. 218.
85. Ch. 313, 39 Stat. 486 (1916) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 241-273
(1994)).
86. See Rice, 331 U.S. at 236-37.
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house Act initially "provide[d] that although the Secretary of Agriculture
'is authorized to cooperate with State officials charged with the en-
forcement of State laws relating to warehouses, warehousemen' and
their personnel,"87 Congress nevertheless added the language "'the
power, jurisdiction, and authority conferred upon the Secretary of Agri-
culture under the act shall be exclusive with respect to all persons
securing a license hereunder so long as said license remains in ef-
fect."' Relying on the amendment's legislative history for guidance,'
the Court found that Congress adopted the amended language in order
to remedy past difficulties associated with a "dual system of regula-
tion."' The Court concluded that Congress intended to displace state
authority over all federally licensed warehouse operators.9
In Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. de la Cuesta,2
the Court extended the express pre-emption doctrine to regulations
promulgated by a federal agency.93 In Fidelity, the Court addressed
the issue of whether a Federal Loan Bank Board regulation concerning
"due-on-sale" clauses superseded a conflicting state common law doc-
87. Id. at 223-24 (quoting language as originally, enacted, Ch. 313, § 29, 39 Stat.
486 (current version at 7 U.S.C. § 269 (1994))).
88. Id. at 224 (quoting Act Mar. 2, 1931, ch. 366, § 9, 46 Stat. 1465 (1931) (current
version at 7 U.S.C. § 269)).
89. See id. at 233-34 (citing S. REP. No. 1775, 71-3, at 2 (1931); H.R. REP. No. 4,
71-1, at 1 (1929)); H.R. REP. No. 2314, 70-2, at 4 (1928). The Court noted that the
Secretary of Agriculture testified that "'[tlhe amendment suggested relative to section
29 aims to make the Federal warehouse act [sic] independent of any State legislation
on the subject.'" Id. at 223-24 n.4 (quoting Hearing Before Senate Committee on
Agriculture and Forestry on H.R. 7, 71st Cong. 10 (3d Sess. 1929)).
90. See id. at 234.
91. See id. at 235-36.
92. 458 U.S. 141 (1982).
93. See id. at 170; see also Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 700
(1984) (holding application of Oklahoma's alcoholic beverages advertising ban to out-
of-state cable signals carried by Oklahoma cable operators pre-empted by FCC's statu-
tory authority); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 667-68 (1962) (holding inconsistent Texas
community property law pre-empted by Treasury Regulations which created a right of
survivorship in U.S. Savings Bonds); Public Utils. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S.
534, 544-45 (1958) (holding that California Public Utilities Commission's approval of
common carrier rates were not required by United States procurement agents); Leslie
Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 352 U.S. 187, 189-90 (1956) (holding Arkansas statute requir-
ing state license to contract in Arkansas did not apply to federal contractor con-
structing on an Air Force base in Arkansas due to federal regulation of federal con-
tractors).
trine limiting the use of due-on-sale clauses. 4 The Court found that,
under the Home Owners' Loan Act of 1933,"5 Congress intended to
grant the Board authority over federal savings and loan associations.'
The Court concluded that regulations promulgated by the Board
evinced a clear desire to displace state law concerning the due-on-sale
clauses.97 Accordingly, the Court held that the Board's regulation ex-
pressly pre-empted the conflicting state law. 8
2. Federal Occupation-of-the-Field Pre-emption
The federal and state governments, at times, regulate the same area
of law. When the federal regulatory scheme becomes so pervasive, how-
ever, it may displace all state regulatory action in the same area.' Dis-
placement may occur in one of two manners. First, the federal regulato-
ry interest may dominate to such an extent as to justify federal occupa-
tion-of-the-field.' ° Alternatively, a federal regulatory scheme may be
so pervasive as to completely occupy a particular field, thus negating
any state regulations in that field."'
94. See Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 144.
95. 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (1994).
96. See Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 159-67.
97. See id. at 158.
98. See id. at 170.
99. See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of St., Elec. Ry. & Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296 (1971) (holding employment-related complaint was within
the National Labor Relations Board's exclusive jurisdiction); Guss v. Utah Labor Rela-
tions Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1957) (holding National Labor Relations Board had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over labor relations affecting interstate commerce); Napier v. At-
lantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 612-13 (1926) (holding state legislation was pre-
cluded by the Boiler Inspection Act, which regulated locomotive equipment on inter-
state highways); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1919)
(holding Pennsylvania law requiring a certain platform on train cabooses "invade[d] a
subject of regulation fully occupied by Congress"); Southern Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n,
236 U.S. 439, 447 (1915) (holding Indiana law requiring grab-ons and hand-holds on
railroad cars used in interstate commerce was superseded by the Safety Appliance
Act).
100. See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959) (holding
that the National Labor Relations Board's dominant interest in regulating labor rela-
tions effectively ousted a state court from awarding damages for a union's unfair
labor practices).
101. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (holding that Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission's pervasive authority over the financial activities
of natural gas companies effectively precluded state regulation of gas company rates
and facilities). But see Hillsborough County v. Automated Med. Lab., Inc., 471 U.S.
707 (1985) (finding that FDA's comprehensive regulation of blood products alone was
not enough to exclude more extensive state regulation).
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3. Actual Conflict Pre-emption
When a federal statute or regulation conflicts with state law, the
federal statute or regulation prevails. 102 A conflict may arise in one' of
three ways: (1) when state law requires action that federal law prohib-
its, or vice versa;"°' (2) when a state law diminishes or interferes with
the exercise of a federal right;' or (3) when state law frustrates the
objectives of federal law without openly conflicting with it."5
4. CipoUone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
In 1992, the Court in CipoUone v. Liggett Group, Inc."'6 addressed
the issue of whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act
of 1965 (FCLAA) °7 and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of
1969 (PHCSA)"'0 pre-empted various state common law tort
102. See, e.g., Fidelity, 458 U.S. at 153.
103. See McDermott v. Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115, 137 (1913) (holding that FDA label-
ing requirement made it impossible to comply with state labeling statute and thus the
state law was pre-empted).
104. See Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950) (holding that state community
property law that diminishes right to military insurance policies is pre-empted).
105. See International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (holding pre-
emptive effect where state law designed to protect water pollution interfered with
federal methods of achieving the same goal); Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass'n v.
Agricultural Mktg. & Bargaining Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984) (finding pre-emptive effect
where state organizing of agricultural growers would frustrate federal regulatory inten-
tions of safeguarding growers' choice of marketing products). But see Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984) (upholding state court award of punitive dam-
.ages against nuclear power plant despite potential interference with Nuclear Regulato-
ry Commission's punitive system of civil fines).
106. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
107. Pub. L No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1341 (1994)). The pre-emption language in the Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act of 1965 (FCLAA) provides in part as follows:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement re-
quired by section 4 of this Act, shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No statement relating to smoking and health shall be required in the
advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity
with the provisions of this Act.
Id. at § 5(a)-(b), 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. (79 Stat.) 300.
108. Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1340 (1994)). The Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (PHCSA)
amended the pre-emption provision in § 5(b) of the FCLAA to read as follows: "(b)
claims.'" First, the Court held that the FCLAA did not pre-empt any
state law damages claim.' Further, the Court held that the PHCSA
expressly pre-empted a state tort claim for improper warning labels on
cigarette advertising.' Finally, the Court held that the PHCSA did not
necessarily pre-empt state claims for breach of express warranty, nus-
representation, or conspiracy."2
In Cipollone, the plaintiffs, a husband, and his wife who died of lung
cancer, alleged that various cigarette companies failed to provide ade-
quate warnings about the risks of smoking, that they expressly warrant-
ed their products as not dangerous to the health of consumers, and that
they attempted to neutralize the effects of statutorily required warn-
ings."' The plaintiffs further alleged that the cigarette companies ig-
nored medical evidence about the dangers of smoking and conspired to
prevent such medical evidence from reaching the general public."4
The cigarette companies contended that the FCLAA and the PHCSA
pre-empted all the state tort claims."'
Justice Stevens, writing for a plurality of the Court, postulated that
the Court's analysis should be guided by the fact that "'the historic
police powers of the States [are] not to be superseded by... Federal
Act[s] unless that [is] the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.""'6
Thus, ""'[t]he purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone of pre-
emption analysis."'""' 7 Justice Stevens found that when a statute con-
tains an express pre-emption provision, implied theories of pre-emption
No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under
State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this Act." Id. at § 5(b),
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.) 95.
109. See CipoUone, 505 U.S. at 508.
110. See id. at 519-20.
111. See id. at 524.
112. See id. at 525-30. The Supreme Court summarized its holding stating:
The 1965 Act [FCLAA] did not pre-empt state-law damages actions; the 1969
Act [PHCSA] pre-empts petitioner's claims based on a failure to warn and the
neutralization of federally mandated warnings to the extent that those claims
rely on omissions or inclusions in respondents' advertising or promotions; the
1969 Act does not pre-empt petitioner's claims based on express warranty,
intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or conspiracy.
Id. at 530-31.
113. See id. at 509-10.
114. See id.
115. See id. at 510.
116. Id. at 516 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947))
(alterations in original).
117. Id. (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978) (quoting
Retail Clerks v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963)).
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should not be controlling. 8 In other words, when Congress intends to
define a particular area for pre-emption, all other areas presumptively
should be excluded from pre-emption. 9
Justice Stevens examined whether the FCLAA expressly prohibited
any "'requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health... im-
posed under State law with respect to... advertising or promo-
tion.'" ° Applying the principles propounded, Justice Stevens conclud-
ed in the affirmative, reasoning that the duty to warn is "a state-law
'requirement... with respect to... advertising or promotion."""' Ac-
cordingly, the warning claims were pre-empted to the extent that they
penalized the cigarette companies for failing to provide warnings over
and above those required by federal law. 2' Justice Stevens found,
however, that the breach of warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and
conspiracy claims did not have the same effect and therefore should
not be pre-empted.l'
C. Federal Pre-emption and the Medical Device Amendments
Similar to the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act at issue
in Cipollone," Congress also explicitly provided for federal pre-emp-
tion under the Medical Device Amendments. 2' Specifically, 21 U.S.C.
§ 360k provides that the MDA pre-empts any state and local "require-
ment (1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement
applicable under the [MDA], and (2) which relates to the safety or ef-
118. See id. at 517. Justice Stevens wrote:
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has included in
the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that issue, and when
that provision provides a reliable indicium of congressional intent with re-
spect to state authority, there is no need to infer congressional intent to pre-
empt state laws from the substantive provisions of the legislation.
Id. (citations omitted).
119. See id.
120. Id. at 524 (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No.
91-222, § 5(b), 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340
(1994))).
121. Id. (quoting Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 § 5(b)).
122. See id. at 524-25.
123. See id. at 525-31.
124. See supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text (discussing the Cipollone case).
125. See 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1976).
fectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a require-
ment applicable to the device under the [MDA]."" 6
Just as the Justices of the Supreme Court could not find consensus in
Cipollone,'27 the courts of appeals have disagreed on whether and to
what extent the Medical Device Amendments pre-empt state common
law actions." Three distinct interpretations of the MDA's pre-emptive
powers have emerged from the circuit courts. Depending on the circuit,
a court may find that the MDA pre-empts all state tort claims," some
state tort claims,' 3° or no state tort claims."'
The circuits which hold that the MDA pre-empts all state common
law claims'32 find that the MDA's pre-emption clause" pre-empts a
126. Id. § 360k(a)(1)-(2). Section 360k provides in full:
State and local requirements respecting devices
(a) General rule
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, no State or political
subdivision of a State may establish or continue in effect with respect to a
device intended for human use any requirement-
(1) which is different from, or in addition to, any requirement applicable un-
der this chapter to the device, and
(2) which relates to the safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other
matter included in a requirement applicable to the device under this chapter.
(b) Exempt requirements
Upon application of a State or a political subdivision thereof, the Secretary
may, by regulation promulgated after notice and opportunity for an oral hear-
ing, exempt from subsection (a) of this section, under such conditions as
may be prescribed in such regulation, a requirement of such State or political
subdivision applicable to a device intended for human use if-
(1) the requirement is more stringent than a requirement under this chapter




(A) is required by compelling local conditions, and
(B) compliance with the requirement would not cause the device to be
in violation of any applicable requirement under this chapter.
Id. § 360k.
127. Cipolone, 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion).
128. See Dega, supra note 71, at 633-46 (describing the split in the circuits over
MDA pre-emption).
129. See Talbott v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 63 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA
pre-empts all state tort claims), cert. dismissed, 116 S. Ct. 1892 (1996).
130. See Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
MDA pre-empts some state tort claims), qffd in part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct.
2240 (1996).
131. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
MDA does not pre-empt any state tort claims).
132. See, e.g., Martello v. CIBA Vision Corp., 42 F.3d 1167 (8th Cir. 1994) (holding
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state "requirement" that "establishes a new substantive requirement for
[a] device in a regulated area.""u These courts reason that 21 U.S.C.
that the MDA pre-empts state product liability claims); Gile v. Optical Radiation
Corp., 22 F.3d 540 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the MDA pre-empts product liability
and negligence claims); Mendes v. Medtronic, Inc., 18 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that the MDA pre-empts negligent manufacture, distribution, failure to warn, and
breach of implied warranty claims); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir.
1993) (holding that the MDA pre-empts defective design, inadequate warnings, and
negligent failure to warn claims); King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st Cir.
1993) (holding that the MDA pre-empts all state tort claims.).
133. 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (1994). See supra note 126, for the complete text of
§ 360k
134. King, 983 F.2d at 1134-35 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995)). FDA regu-
lations interpreting the pre-emptive effect of § 360k of the Medical Device Amend-
ments provide:
(d) State or local requirements are preempted only when the Food and Drug
Administration has established specific counterpart regulations or there are
other specific requirements applicable to a particular device under the act,
thereby making any existing divergent State or local requirements applicable
to the device different from, or in addition to, the specific Food and Drug
Administration requirements. There are other State or local requirements that
affect devices that are not preempted by section 521(a) of the act because
they are not "requirements applicable to a device" within the meaning of sec-
tion 521(a) of the act. The following are examples of State or local require-
ments that are not regarded as preempted by section 521 of the act:
(6) (i) Section 521(a) does not preempt State or local requirements respecting
general enforcement, e.g., requirements that State inspection be permitted of
factory records concerning all devices, registration, and licensing requirements
for manufacturers and others, and prohibition of manufacture of devices in
unlicensed establishments. However, Federal regulations issued under sections
519 and 520(0 of the act may impose requirements for records and reports
and good manufacturing practices beyond those prescribed in State or local
requirements. If there is a conflict between such regulations and State or lo-
cal requirements, the Federal regulations shall prevail.
(ii) Generally, section 521(a) does not preempt a State or local requirement
prohibiting the manufacture of adulterated or misbranded devices. Where,
however, such a prohibition has the effect of establishing a substantive re-
quirement for a specific device, e.g., a specific labeling requirement, then the
prohibition will be pre-empted if the requirement is different from, or in
addition to, a Federal requirement established under the act. In determining
whether such a requirement is pre-empted, the determinative factor is how
the requirement is interpreted and enforced by the State or local government
and not the literal language of the statute, which may be identical to a provi-
sion in the act.
21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(i)-(ii).
§ 360k provides for broad pre-emption that encompasses all state tort
actions that are "different from, or in addition to" the MDA.'" These
courts, therefore, conclude that any successful claim must be pre-
empted, equating a judgment to a state-created requirement differing or
surpassing FDA regulations on the manufacturer."6
Other circuits have adopted a different approach, resulting in the pre-
emption of only some state tort claims.'37 These courts interpret 21
U.S.C. § 360k to include state common law actions within the meaning
of the term "requirement."3 ' Contrary to the teachings of
Cipollone"'39 which limit statutory interpretation to the plain meaning
of the statute, some courts look to the FDA's regulations for guid-
ance. 40 Courts seeking guidance from 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)"' of the
FDA regulations conclude that a state tort action is only pre-empted if
the tort action conflicts with the MDA or FDA regulations pertaining to
a particular process, procedure, or device.4 4 Thus, pre-emption is
evoked only when the state tort claim would create a requirement that
135. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1995); See Stamps, 984 F.2d at 1421; 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(b)
(1996).
136. See King, 983 F.2d at 1135-36.
137. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the MDA pre-empts express warranty claim, if properly established, but does not pre-
empt implied warranty, nislabeling, and fraud claims); Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56
F.3d 1335 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA pre-empted two state tort claims,
but did not pre-empt two others), affd in part and rev'd in part, 116 S. Ct. 2240
(1996); Feldt v. Mentor Corp., 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA
does not pre-empt design defect claims against manufacturers, but does pre-empt
marketing defect, manufacturing defect, and inadequate warning claims); Michael v.
Shiley, Inc., 46 F.3d 1316 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding that the MDA does not pre-empt
express warranty and fraud in advertising claims, but does pre-empt negligence, strict
liability, breach of implied warranty, and fraud claims).
138. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1342.
139. 505 U.S. at 517; see supra notes 106-23 and accompanying text (discussing the
Cipollone case).
140. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1344. Giving deference to the agency's interpretations, the
Eleventh Circuit focused on § 808.1(d) of the FDA regulations and interpreted the
term requirement to mean "specific requirement." See id. at 1344-45 (citing
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Lab., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 712-14 (1985)
(finding regulations promulgated by a federal agency are to be given deference in
interpreting statutory meaning)).
141. 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1996).
142. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1346. The Eleventh Circuit held that the MDA did not
pre-empt a negligent design claim because neither the statute nor the FDA regulations
"establish[ed] any specific design requirements ... conflict[ing] with the state law
claim." See id. at 1349. The court concluded, however, that FDA regulation of manu-
facturing and labeling practices required pre-emption of state claims for negligent
manufacturing and failure to warn claims in that successful claims would be "differ-
ent from or in addition to" the FDA requirements. See id. at 1350-51.
[Vol. 25: 647, 1998] Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
is "different from or in addition to" the MDA requirements or the FDA
regulations. "
Finally, a small but growing number of courts have held that the
MDA can never pre-empt a state tort claim. By adhering strictly to
the plain meaning of 21 U.S.C. § 360k of the MDA, these courts hold
that Congress did not intend a "requirement" to include a state common
law action.' Additionally, these courts use the FDA regulations to
bolster their position that Congress did not intend to pre-empt state tort
actions.'4 6
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided Medtronic, Inc.
v. Lohr.1
47
143. See id. at 1350-51.
144. See, e.g., Mulligan v. Pfizer, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 633 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (holding
that the MDA did not pre-empt the strict liability, negligence, and breach of implied
warranty claims of a user of a prosthetic knee device); Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 848
F. Supp. 905 (D. Colo. 1994) (finding that the MDA did not pre-empt a products lia-
bility claim under state law for an allegedly defective hip replacement device);
Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. Supp. 13 (D. Conn. 1989) (concluding that
the MDA did not pre-empt the state-based claim of failure to warn with regard to
breast implants); Callan v. G.D. Searle & Co., 709 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1989) (hold-
ing that a plaintiffs state tort claims were not pre-empted as a result of her injuries
sustained due to use of an intrauterine device); Kociemba v. G.D. Searle & Co., 680
F. Supp. 1293 (D. Minn. 1988) (concluding that the state law products liability claim
of an intrauterine device user was not pre-empted by the MDA); Larsen v. Pacesetter
Sys., Inc., 837 P.2d 1273 (Haw. 1992) (concluding that an implied warranty claim for
injuries caused by defective pacemaker was not pre-empted by the MDA); Haudrich v.
Howmedica, Inc., 642 N.E.2d 206 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (ruling that the MDA did not
pre-empt a common law products liability claim against a knee implant manufactur-
er), affd, 662 N.E.2d 1248 (l11. 1996); Fogal v. Steinfeld, 620 N.Y.S.2d 875 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1994) (holding that the defective design, breach of warranty, and failure to warn
claims against a pacemaker manufacturer were not pre-empted).
145. See Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 67 F.3d 1453, 1457 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that
the MDA does not pre-empt any state common law claims including negligence, strict
liability, breach of warranty, battery, conspiracy and loss of consortium). The Ninth
Circuit noted that precedent dictated a presumption against finding pre-emption. See
id. Further, the court determined that Congress failed to define a "state requirement"
subject to pre-emption and noted the absurd results under other courts' interpreta-
tions of 21 U.S.C. § 360k. See id. at 1457-59.
146. See id. at 1459. Deferring to the FDA interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 360k, the
Ninth Circuit found that 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) did not pre-empt generally applicable
requirements, but rather only "specific requirements." See id. at 1459. The court con-
cluded that a state tort action constituted a generally applicable law and, therefore,
could not be pre-empted by the MDA. See id.
147. 116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996).
III. SUMMARY OF FACTS
In 1987, doctors surgically implanted a pacemaker in the chest of
Lora Lohr."4 Three years later, the pacemaker failed, allegedly causing
Lohr to suffer severe injuries that required her to undergo emergency
surgery to replace her pacemaker.' Medtronic, Inc., the manufacturer
of Lohr's pacemaker, received FDA approval to place the Class III de-
vice in the marketplace after only cursory review."n Lohr, and her
husband, filed a civil suit in Florida state court pleading four theories of
liability: three under negligence (design, manufacturing, failure to ade-
quately warn) and one under strict liability (defective device, unreason-
ably dangerous at time of sale). 5' Medtronic removed the case to the
federal district court and filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing
that 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) of the MDA pre-empted all state law claims.52
The district court eventually agreed with the defendant and dismissed
the action." The Eleventh Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in
part, holding that the MDA pre-empted the Lohrs' negligent manufactur-
ing and warning claims, but that the strict liability and negligent design
claims were not pre-empted." 4 On cross-petitions, the United States
148. See Brief for Cross-Petitioners, supra note 3, at 1.
149. See id. at 2.
150. See id. at 7-8; supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (discussing premarket
approval of Class III devices under the MDA). Medtronic's pacemaker and leads quali-
fied as "substantially equivalent" devices requiring review under the less rigorous
premarket notification requirements of § 510(k). See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2246-47
(citing Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the
House Committee on Energy & Commerce, 100th Cong. 384 (1987)) (noting that the
FDA spends an average of 1200 hours reviewing Class II application during the PMA
process, while only 20 hours on average in the premarket notification review). Fur-
ther, statistics indicate that over 8096 of all Class III medical devices on the market
in 1990 did not go through the rigorous PMA process. See id. at 2247.
151. See id. at 2248. Specifically, Lohr "alleged that Medtronic had designed, manu-
factured, and assembled its pacemaker in an unreasonably dangerous manner and
that the pacemaker was prone to sudden catrostraphic failure. [Lohr] further alleged
that Medtronic had failed to warn Ms. Lohr or her physicians of the product's threat-
ening tendency to life-threatening failure." Brief for Cross-Petitioners, supra note 3, at
8-9. The district court dismissed a breach of warranty cause of action finding that
Lohr failed to state a claim under Florida law. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2248.
152. See id.
153. See id. The district court initially denied Medtronic's motion for summary judg-
ment, but subsequently granted the motion on reconsideration in light of Duncan v.
Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1994). See id. at 2249.
154. See id.; Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335, 1352 (11th Cir. 1995). In pre-
empting some of Lohr's state tort claims, the Eleventh Circuit followed the holdings
and rationale of three other circuits. See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1352; supra notes 12446
and accompanying text (discussing the holdings of pre-emption cases under the MDA
in the Third, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh circuits). Following the rationale of these
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circuits, the Eleventh Circuit focused on two threshold questions, namely:. (1) what
constitutes a "State requirement," and (2) what constitutes a "requirement" under the
MDA? See Lohr, 56 F.3d at 1342 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 360k (1994)). First, the court
found that a "state requirement" under 21 U.S.C. § 360k included state common law
tort actions. See id. (citing Duncan v. Iolab Corp., 12 F.3d 194 (11th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing various state tort claims pre-empted by the MDA)).
Next, the Eleventh Circuit turned to what constituted an "MDA requirement"
under 21 U.S.C. § 360k. See id. at 1343. The court relied on the interpretation of 21
U.S.C. § 360k in the FDA regulations for guidance to determine the meaning of re-
quirement. See id. Finding that the Cipollone decision did not prohibit it from relying
on an agency's interpretation of a pre-emption clause, the court stated:
While the opinion speaks only of "the express language" of the statutes, nei-
ther of the statutes examined in Cipollone had regulations interpreting its
pre-emptive scope and nothing in the opinion indicates that the issue of pre-
emption regulations was ever raised or considered . . . . We are therefore
unable to conclude that Cipollone created an express pre-emption rule which
forecloses our examination of the FDA's regulations.
Id. at 1343-44. The Eleventh Circuit opined that the principle of giving deference to
an agency's regulatory interpretation of a statute was "well established." See id. at
1344 (citing NationsBank N.A. v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 513 U.S. 251 (1995);
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-43
(1984)). Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit found the FDA's pre-emption regulations
reasonable and worthy of deference. See id. at 1345. Unfortunately, the FDA pre-emp-
tion regulation provided only modest clarification. See id. Following the holdings of
the First, Third, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, the court rejected a finding that specific
requirement meant a "device-specific requirement." See id. at 1346. Rather, the court
held that "pre-emption-triggering requirements should, in some way, be 'restricted by
nature' to a particular process, procedure, or device and should not be completely
open-ended." Id. (footnote omitted).
Turning to the specifics of Lohr's particular claims, the Eleventh Circuit evaluat-
ed each claim to determine if the "state requirement" was "different from, or in addi-
tion to" the "specific MDA requirement" See id. Under this approach, the court con-
cluded that the negligent design claims were not pre-empted because FDA regulations
did not establish any specific requirements governing design. See id. at 1347. The
court rejected Medtronic's arguments that the "substantially equivalent" process or
that the FDA's continued surveillance of design changes impacted the safety of the
design. See id. at 1347-49.
To the contrary, the court held that the negligent manufacturing claims were
pre-empted. See id. at 1350. The court found that the negligent manufacturing claim
would create a "state requirement" when a jury determined how a reasonable manu-
facturer should assemble a pacemaker and its leads. See id. Further, the court con-
cluded that the reasonable manufacturer standard would be "different from, or in
addition to" the Good Manufacturing Practices (GMP), 21 C.F.R. §§ 801.1-820.198
(1996), which constituted specific requirements under the MDA. See id. Likewise, the
court held that the MDA pre-empted plaintiffs negligent failure to warn claim. See id.
at 1351. The court observed that a jury determination of what constituted a reason-
Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine if and to what extent the
MDA pre-empted the state common law claims.'5'
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE CASE
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of appeals
"insofar as it held that any of the claims were pre-empted and affirmed
insofar as it rejected the pre-emption defense."" The three separate
opinions elucidate the disparate approaches of the Justices.
A. Justice Stevens's Opinion
1. Plurality Opinion
Delivering the opinion of the Court,"7 Justice Stevens examined
Medtronic's contention that 21 U.S.C. § 360k pre-empts "any and all
common-law claims."" Justice Stevens found the argument "not only
unpersuasive, [but] implausible.""' He recognized that granting pre-
emption of all common-law claims via the MDA was tantamount to
giving all medical device manufacturers complete immunity against civil
suits for their defective products."°
Furthermore, Justice Stevens found that Congress's use of the word
"requirement" in the MDA provided an altogether different intent.'
Distinguishing the language under the Public Health Cigarette Smoking
able warning could be "different from, or in addition to" the FDA's labeling re-
quirements, 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1996). See id. Accordingly, the court upheld the
district court's finding that the MDA pre-empted the negligent manufacturing and
negligent warning claims. See id. at 1350-51.
Finally, the court addressed the strict liability claim that Medtronic introduced
an unreasonably dangerous product into the market. See id. at 1351. The court held
that the strict liability claim generally was not pre-empted; however, any contention
that the manufacturing or labeling of the product created the unreasonable danger-
ousness, the claim would be pre-empted. See id. at 1352.
155. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 806 (1996), affd in part and revd in part,
116 S. Ct. 2240 (1996). The Court noted that the courts of appeals were divided over
the extent of pre-emption afforded common-law claims under the MDA. See
Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2250 n.6; see also supra notes 127-46 and accompanying text
(discussing the three different approaches used by courts of appeals).
156. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2259.
157. See id. at 2245. Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court as to Parts
I, 11, I, V, and VII, and the plurality opinion in Parts IV and VI joined only by Jus-
tices Kennedy, Souter, and Ginsburg. See id.
158. See id. at 2251.
159. Id.
160. See id.
161. See id. at 2252.
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Act of 1969 at issue in Cipollone,62 Justice Stevens clarified that the
cigarette labeling statute narrowly restricted only requirements "involv-
ing the 'advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of
which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of the [Public
Health Cigarette Smoking Act]." 3 Conversely, 21 U.S.C. § 360k's
broadly worded prohibitions would "require far greater interference
with state legal remedies, producing a serious intrusion into state sover-
eignty while simultaneously wiping out the possibility of remedy for the
Lohrs' alleged injuries."64
Finally, turning to the legislative intent underlying the MDA, Justice
Stevens found that the overriding intent of Congress was "'to provide
for the safety and effectiveness of medical devices intended for human
use. M'6' Although Congress may have intended to "protect innovations
in device technology from being 'stifled by unnecessary restric-
tions,'"'" the plurality found that such an intent was directed at over-
regulation rather than pre-existing common law duties.
61
2. Application to the Lohrs' Claims
Justice Stevens turned to the issue of whether the MDA pre-empted
the Lohrs' particular state law claims."
a. Design defect claim-Unanimous opinion
The Court unanimously held that the Lohr's design defect claim was
162. 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (plurality opinion); see supra notes 106-23 and accompany-
ing text (discussing the historical significance of Cipollone).
163. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252 (quoting CipoUone, 505 U.S. at 515).
164. Id. The Court also gave credence to the fact that the pre-emptive effect in
CipoUone was derived from Congressional action whereas the action in Medtronic
was derived from agency action. See id. at 2252 n.9.
165. Id. at 2253 (quoting Medical Device Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-295,
90 Stat. 539 (1976) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C., 21 U.S.C.,
42 U.S.C.)); see supra note 71 (criticizing the misguided notion that the "overriding"
or "primary" intent of Congress in passing the MDA was the protection of the indi-
vidual).
166. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2253 (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3
(quoting H.R. REP. No. 94-853, at 12 (1976))).
167. See id.
168. See id. at 2253-58.
not pre-empted.'69 The Court noted that Medtronic's defective pace-
maker lead entered the market under the § 510(k)'7 ° process which
"'focus[es] on equivalence, not safety.'"'7' The Court reasoned that a
device "substantially equivalent" to a pre-existing device is not neces-
sarily safe or effective. 2 Thus, a plaintiff is not pre-empted from
bringing a design defect cause of action for a product gaining market
access via the § 510(k) process. 73
b. Breach of a duty claim-Unanimous opinion
The full Court also agreed that the MDA did not pre-empt a breach of
a duty claim against a manufacturer that also violates a federal statute
or regulation." The Court concluded that "[n]othing in § 360k denies
[a state] the right to provide a traditional damages remedy for viola-
tions of common law duties when those duties parallel federal require-
ments."'7 The Court reasoned that such state-law causes of action
granting damages do not constitute a requirement different from, or in
addition to, any requirement applicable under the MDA.'
7 6
c. Manufacturing and labeling claims-Plurality opinion
A plurality of the Court held that the Lohrs' manufacturing and warn-
ing defect claims were not pre-empted.' The plurality deferred to the
FDA's regulations and judgment that "state requirements are pre-empted
'only' when the FDA has established 'specific counterpart regulations
169. See id. at 2255.
170. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(f)(2)(C)(ii) (1994). Under the premarket notification process
(also referred to as the "510(k) mechanism" and "substantial equivalence" method), a
company may market and distribute a new device without first obtaining FDA ap-
proval if the manufacturer establishes that the device is "substantially equivalent" to a
device that has already been approved. See id.; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 94-1090, at 56-57
(1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1070, 1103-18; see also BRADLEY M. THOMPSON,
FDA REGULATION OF MEDICAL DEVICES 41-58 (1995) (providing a detailed description of
the premarket notification procedure, the substantial equivalence method, the § 510(k)
process, and other special rules). The FDA requires significantly less information for
premarket notification than for a PMA application. See supra notes 61-70 and accom-
panying text (discussing the PMA process).
171. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2254 (quoting Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc., 56 F.3d 1335,
1348 (11th Cir. 1995), affd in part, rev'd in part, Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. 2240).
172. See id.
173. See id. at 2255.
174. Id. at 2255-56.
175. Id. at 2255.
176. See id.; see also supra notes 72-146 and accompanying text (discussing federal
pre-emption).
177. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2256-58.
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or... other specific requirements applicable to a particular de-
vice.'"1 Finding that tort actions reflect only "generic concerns about
device regulation generally," and that "general state common-law re-
quirements... were not specifically developed 'with respect to' medical
devices," Justice Stevens concluded that the Lohrs' claims did not con-
stitute "requirements" pre-empted by federal law."
3. An Issue Left Open
The Court left open the issue of whether the MDA pre-empts claims
regarding a device that obtained premarket approval."8 The Court
stated that it need not resolve hypothetical cases and believed "[i]t will
be rare indeed for a court hearing a common-law cause of action to
issue a decree that has 'the effect of establishing a substantive require-
ment for a specific device.'"'8 '
B. Justice Breyer's Opinion
Justice Breyer, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
raised two questions: "First, do the Medical Device Amendments
(MDA)... ever pre-empt a state law tort action? Second, if so, does the
MDA pre-empt the particular state-law tort claims at issue here?"" To
the first question, Justice Breyer adopted Justice O'Connor's rationale
and found that the MDA will sometimes pre-empt a state-law tort
claim." To the second question, Justice Breyer turned to the intent of
Congress, finding that Lohr's claims were not pre-empted by the
MDA.l4
178. Id. at 2257 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d) (1995) (current version at 21 C.F.R.
§ 801.1(d) (1997))) (omission in original).
179. See id. at 2258.
180. See id. at 2259.
181. Id. (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 808.1(d)(6)(ii) (1995) (current version at 21 C.F.R.
§ 801.1(d)(6)(ii) (1997))).
182. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
183. See id. at 2259-60 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
184. See id. at 2260-61 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment).
C. Justice O'Connor's Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Scalia and Thomas, concurred in part and dissented in part.' The dis-
sent reasoned that CipoUone was controlling and commanded that the
phrase "no requirement or prohibition" included certain state law
claims.'" Justice O'Connor concluded, contrary to the plurality, that
the term "requirement" in the MDA includes state common law tort ac-
tions.'8 7 Accordingly, the MDA pre-empts such state-law tort claims "to
the extent that their recognition would impose 'any requirement' differ-
ent from, or in addition to, FDCA requirements applicable to the de-
vice."' Justice O'Connor concluded that the design defect claim is
not pre-empted because under the § 510(k) "substantial equivalency"
process, no federal requirements have been placed on Medtronic's pace-
maker device."
Furthermore, the dissenters agreed that a state tort action based on a
violation of a federal requirement (i.e., the FDCA or a FDA regulation)
would not be pre-empted.'" Justice O'Connor reasoned that a state
action requiring a standard of care equal to the federal requirements
does not create a requirement "different from, or in addition to" any
federal requirement. 9'
Justice O'Connor disagreed, however, with the Court's conclusion
that state common law claims not based on a violation of a federal
requirement survive pre-emption.' 2 Justice O'Connor took issue with
the plurality's use of the FDA's regulations in order to determine the
meaning of "requirement" as used in the MDA pre-emption provi-
sion." Accordingly, the dissent more broadly defined "requirement" to
185. See id. at 2262-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
186. See id. at 2262-63 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
187. See id. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting
that Justice Breyer's separate opinion is consistent with the notion that the term
requirement encompasses state common law tort actions).
188. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See id. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Jus-
tice O'Connor specifically noted that the § 510(k) review process for substantially
equivalent devices places no requirements on the manufacturer and the FDA merely
determines if the new device is equivalent to a pre-1976 device. See id. at 2264
(O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
190. See id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
191. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part).
193. See id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). "'If the statute
contains an express pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the
first instance focus on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains
the best evidence of Congress' pre-emptive intent.'" Id. at 2263 (O'Connor, J., concur-
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include a state tort action and did not require that the state claim be
"device-specific."" u Therefore, the dissenters found, in contrast to the
plurality, that the manufacturing defect and failure-to-warn claims
should be pre-empted."9 5 Justice O'Connor reasoned that the manufac-
turing and failure-to-warn claims, if successful, would create state-creat-
ed requirements differing from the FDA's Good Manufacturing Practice
(GMP)" and labeling requirements.'97
V. IMPACT OF THE DECISION
The Medtronic holding will have immediate and far reaching effects.
First, the immediate impact will be felt by the parties to six medical
devices cases remanded for further consideration in light of the
Medtronic decision.'98 The holdings of the courts of appeals could
have lasting ramifications for the medical devices industry and custom-
ers who rely on their products." In addition to federal regulation of
the medical devices industry, many other federal regulatory schemes
contain pre-emption clauses."0 Analyzing the methodology of statutory
ring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658, 664 (1993)).
194. See id. at 2263-64 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
195. See id. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
196. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 820.20-.198 (1996) (requiring specific organizational, personnel,
reporting, storage, manufacturing, and safety standards).
197. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2264 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part); 21 C.F.R. § 801.109 (1996) (requiring label to include such information
as indications, effects, routes, methods, frequency and duration of administration,
relevant hazards, contraindications, side effects, and precautions).
198. See Mentor Corp. v. Bingham, 116 S. Ct. 2577, granting cert. to, vacating judg-
ment of, and remanding 77 F.3d 478 (5th Cir. 1996); Martin v. Telectronics Pacing
Sys., Inc., 116 S. Ct. 2576 (1996), granting cert. to, vacating judgment of, and re-
manding 70 F.3d 39 (6th Cir. 1995), on remand to 105 F.3d 1090 (6th Cir. 1997),
cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 850 (1998); Duvall v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 116 S. Ct.
2575 (1996), granting cert. to, vacating judgment of, and remanding 65 F.3d 392
(4th Cir. 1995), on remand to 103 F.3d 324 (4th Cir. 1996); English v. Mentor Corp.,
116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), granting cert. to, vacating judgment of, and remanding 67
F.3d 477 (3d Cir. 1995); Mentor Corp. v. Feldt, 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), granting cert.
to, vacating judgment of, and remanding 61 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1995), on remand to
95 F.3d 4 (5th Cir. 1996); Mitchell v. Collagen Corp., 116 S. Ct. 2575 (1996), granting
cert. to, vacating judgment of, and remanding 67 F.3d 1268 (7th Cir. 1995), on re-
mand to 126 F.3d 902 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1300 (1998).
199. See infra notes 203-17 and accompanying text (discussing the possible impact
of the Medtronic decision on the medical devices industry).
200. See, e.g., Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341
interpretation may elucidate the underlying and elusive rationale of the
Court's pre-emption decision, thus providing a means to predict future
pre-emption controversies."0 ' Finally, although limiting its discussion
to the issue of pre-emption and focusing its analysis on statutory in-
terpretation, the Court obfuscated its holdings on other important pub-
lic policy and constitutional considerations. 2
A. Impact on the Medical Devices Industry
Prior to the Supreme Court rendering its decision, commentators
hailed the Medtronic case as pitting consumer protection against medi-
cal device development.2" On the one side, consumers, concerned by
inadequate federal regulation, feared that pre-emption would eliminate
the only viable economic check on manufacturers-a state common-law
tort claim. 4 On the other hand, medical devices manufacturers feared
that "out-of-control" products liability litigation would significantly ham-
per the industry's ability to cost-effectively research, develop, and man-
ufacture new lifesaving devices.2"5
Consumers, and their attorneys, argue that in appropriate situations,
tort litigation can "insure that the costs of injuries resulting from defec-
tive products are borne by the manufacturers that put such products on
the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to
protect themselves."2" Even the threat of tort action creates an eco-
(1994); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y
(1994). The impact on the above referenced regulatory schemes is beyond the scope
of this Note. For a summary of developments in pre-emption case law related to
state product liability actions, see Richard C. Ausness, Federal Preemption of State
Products Liability Doctrines, 44 S.C. L. REv. 187 (1993).
201. See generally Ausness, supra note 200, at 200-52 (reviewing product liability
pre-emption cases and theories of statutory interpretation).
202. See infra notes 218-59 and accompanying text (discussing the unstated consti-
tutional forces favoring the use of pre-emption as the basis for rendering a decision).
203. See Henry, supra note 13, at I (noting that the issue of pre-emption depends
on balancing two competing interests-compensating an injured plaintiff and promot-
ing medical device development-and may lean in favor of the medical devices indus-
try).
204. See Walsh & Pyrich, supra note 29, at 931-48 (discussing the various problems
and shortcomings of the FDA approval process for drugs and medical devices).
205. See Henry, supra note 13, at 8; Product Liability: Senator to Seek Changes in
Product Liability Law, 1994 DER (BNA) No. 97, at D6 (May 23, 1994) [hereinafter
Senator to Seek Changes in Product Liability Law]. In fact, even Lohr admitted in
her complaint that it was likely she would not be alive but for her heart pacemaker.
See id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 1).
206. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, 377 P.2d 897, 901 (1962) (establishing strict
liability against manufacturer of power tool); Cf. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464
U.S. 238, 248-56 (1983) (holding that a tort action against a nuclear power plant was
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nomic incentive for the manufacturer to take the necessary precautions
to ensure that a product is safe for public use. °7
Tort actions, however, may have a negative impact on another impor-
tant public policy concern, namely promoting the development and
manufacture of innovative medical devices.2' Tort claims can have a
chilling effect on manufacturers' willingness to fund research and devel-
opment of medical devices.2" The industry's fear stems not only from
the direct cost of tort litigation, but collateral cost as well.2"0 For ex-
ample, Paul Citron, Vice President of Medtronlc, Inc., and Eleanor
Gackstatter, President of Meadox Medicals, Inc., have testified that
suppliers of raw materials discontinued deliveries to manufacturers of
permanently implantable devices due to product liability concerns.
21
'
Without the protection of federal pre-emption, industry leaders argue,
medical advances are impeded and society loses.212
Despite the industry's concerns, the Court's decision in Medtronic
does not terminate the federal pre-emption debate.213 First, the pace-
maker at issue in Medtronic reached the market without the FDA fully
determining its safety or effectiveness." 4 Additionally, manufacturers
of medical devices can focus their efforts on persuading Congress to re-
evaluate and amend the MDA.2"5 Furthermore, the Court's opinion was
not pre-empted by federal regulations governing nuclear power because tort civil
claims provide an additional safeguard against mismanagement).
207. See Greenman, 377 P.2d at 901 (1944) (citing Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.,
150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring)); William L. Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099, 1122-23
(1960)).
208. See Senator to Seek Changes in Product Liability Law, supra note 205, at D6;
see also supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative intent
underlying the MDA).
209. See Senator to Seek Changes in Product Liability Law, supra note 205, at D6.
Katherine F. Knox of Dupont Co. noted that suppliers of raw materials, like Dupont,
feared liability, even in design defect suits to which a supplier most likely would not
be liable. See id. Knox stated, "Our company cannot justify the millions of dollars in
litigation costs, the court appearances, and the press coverage which may accompany




213. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text (discussing an issue left unad-
dressed by the Medtronic opinion).
214. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing the substantially
equivalent exception to FDA review via the premarket approval process).
215. See, e.g., The Safe Medical Devices Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-629, § 4(a),
based on a scant, pre-discovery record replete of many of the factual
findings that could give rise to an actual conflict between FDA regula-
tions and a state tort claim."' Far from providing definitive guidance
to the lower courts, the Medtronic decision should be narrowly con-
strued and may, therefore, have less of a deleterious effect than origi-
nally assumed."7
B. Pre-emption, Statutory Interpretation, and Public Policy
The Supreme Court's pre-emption decisions have long been con-
demned as "extreme examples of the unwarranted substitution of ju-
dicial wisdom for that of Congress.""8 Professor Richard Ausness pro-
poses, however, a more probing analysis in search of the Court's guid-
ing principles."9 Under Professor Ausness's analysis, policy concerns
including interstate commerce, federalism, agency decisionmaking, con-
sumer safety, and compensation22" guide the Court in determining pre-
emption decisions even though conveyed as statutory interpretation."
104 Stat. 4511, 4515 (1990) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 360c(i) (1994)).
216. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1996) (noting that "the pre-
cise contours of [Lohr's] theory of recovery have not been defined" because the liti-
gation was only at the pleading stage).
217. See R. Lawrence Purdy & Michael C. McCarthy, Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr: A
Work in Progress, 1 MEALEY'S IATIG. REP.: DRUGS & MED. DEVICES 21 (1996).
218. See Everett C. McKeage, Judicial Supergovernment and States' Rights, 64 PUB.
UTL. FORT. 486, 489-91 (1959). But see Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground:
A New Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 224-25 (1959) (concluding that
the Court uses pre-emption analysis to implement constitutional principles outside of
the Supremacy Clause).
219. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 238-251 (describing the Eskridge-Frickey "Prac-
tical Reasoning" Model of statutory interpretation).
220. See id. at 244-45 (defining five policy considerations inevitable in statutory
interpretation).
221. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 116 S. Ct. 1652, 1657 (1996) (holding
that the Federal Arbitration Act pre-empted a Montana state law which conditioned
enforceability of arbitration clause on compliance with special notice requirements);
Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 115 S. Ct. 1745, 1747 (1995) (holding that the Su-
premacy Clause barred Ohio from applying tolling statute to pre-Bendix torts); New
York State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct.
1671, 1683 (1995) (holding that ERISA did not pre-empt state surcharges on health
maintenance organizations (HMOs) paid by an ERISA plan); Freightliner Corp. v.
Myrick, 115 S. Ct. 1483, 1488 (1995) (holding National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safe-
ty Act did not pre-empt state common-law claims); American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
115 S. Ct. 817, 826-27 (1995) (holding Airline Deregulation Act pre-empted state fraud
and deception causes of action but did not pre-empt breach of contract action).
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1. Interstate Commerce
To ensure the vitality of an open economic market, the drafters of
the United States Constitution empowered Congress "[t]o Regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and
with the Indian Tribes. " ' When state legislation inhibits the free flow
of commerce, the Supreme Court consistently invalidates the state law
under the Commerce Clause." Similarly, state tort claims can impose
financial barriers to an open, national market if excessive or oppres-
sive.' Therefore, when state action, either legislative or judicial, in-
terferes with interstate commerce, the Court is more likely to invoke
the pre-emption doctrine.225
The influence of the Commerce Clause on the Court is evident in
Justice Stevens's opinion in Medtronic.22 Nevertheless, Justice
Stevens discounted the legislative history indicating that Congress was
concerned with protecting industry.227 "[F]urthermore, any such con-
cern [for protecting industry] was far outweighed by concerns about
the primary issue motivating the MDA's enactment: the safety of those
who use medical devices." 8 Therefore, Justice Stevens implicitly re-
jected the need for pre-emption to protect trade, but only by balancing
it against the need to protect the health and safety of the individual.229
222. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; see also Ausness, supra note 200, at 245 (stating
that "[pirotection of trade and maintenance of national markets has long been a na-
tional priority").
223. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 678-79 (1981)
(holding state ban on certain commercial vehicles violative of the Commerce Clause).
224. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 246 & nn.448-49 (stating that varying state lia-
bility standards may alter the interstate flow of commercial goods).
225. See id. at 246.
226. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2251 (1996). "Also relevant, how-
ever, is the 'structure and purpose of the statute as a whole,' . . . as revealed not
only in the text, but through the reviewing court's reasoned understanding of the way
in which Congress intended the statute and its surrounding regulatory scheme to
affect business, consumers, and the law." Id. (quoting Gade v. National Solid Wastes
Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)) (citations omitted).




The Founding Fathers believed that a strong centralized government
designed to advance the common welfare of the nation must be bal-
anced by responsive local government.Y Federalism encourages citi-
zens to participate actively in government and to have a voice in the
political process." Federalism embraces diversity by supporting local
government in touch with community needs, thereby allowing states to
craft solutions particularly tailored to their constituencies. 2 The do-
main of protecting the health and safety of its citizens clearly lies with
the states.'n Therefore, the Court has held that, in general, federal law
cannot pre-empt the police powers of the states unless Congress indi-
cates a "clear and manifest" intent to do So.23
In Medtronic, Justice Stevens devoted several pages addressing
whether a state tort action constitutes a requirement under the meaning
of the MDA. 5 Contrasting the "limited set of state requirements" pre-
empted in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., the Court found that
"Medtronic's sweeping interpretation of the statute would require far
greater interference with state legal remedies, producing a serious
intrusion into state sovereignty while simultaneously wiping out the
possibility of remedy for the Lohrs' alleged injuries." 7 Once again,
while on the surface the Court appears to be interpreting the statutory
language to determine Congress's intent to pre-empt state law, a policy
concern to protect the power of the states (i.e., federalism) crept into
the analysis.' The Court found repugnant the idea that Congress
could intrude into the state's domain of protecting the health and safety
230. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 246-47 (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection
of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543, 543 (1954)).
231. See id. at 247.
232. See id.
233. See id.
234. See id. (citing Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); City of Milwau-
kee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 316 (1981); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)).
235. See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2251-52 (1996).
236. 505 U.S. 504 (1992).
237. Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252 (emphasis added). Additionally, the Medtronic
Court found that Congress did not "clearly signal[ I its intent to deprive States of
any role in protecting consumers from the dangers inherent in many medical devic-
es." Id.
238. See id.
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of its citizens without clearly stating such an intent. 9 Accordingly,
the Court, guided by the principles of federalism, found that Congress
did not intend to pre-empt state tort claims.uo
3. Agency Decisionmaking
As regulatory agencies become more pervasive and specialized,
courts are more inclined to defer to agency rules and regulations which
are properly promulgated."l Courts generally trust administrative stan-
dards due to an agency's superior resources, technical expertise, and
familiarity with the relevant issues.u2 Therefore, public policy favors
federal pre-emption to protect agency decisionmaking when
appropriate.'
The Medtronic Court continued the trend of giving deference to agen-
cy regulations.2" Justice Stevens acknowledged that the FDA is
"uniquely qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law
'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress."' The Court found that the au-
thoritative regulations set forth by the FDA supported the conclusion
that the MDA does not pre-empt state tort claims.Y4 Even though the
state tort action was not pre-empted, the Court adopted the policy con-
siderations that support agency decisionmaking.
4. Public Health and Safety
Protecting the health and safety of the public can be achieved by
state tort doctrines or federal regulatory schemes. 7 Due to the con-
sistent aims of state products liability doctrines and federal product
239. See id.; see also Ausness, supra note 200, at 248.
240. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252. Cf. Cipolone, 505 U.S. 504, 514 (1992)
(holding federal law limiting .any state requirement on cigarette labeling was pre-
empted).
241. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 248-50 (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)).
242. See id. at 249.
243. See id.
244. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2255-56.
245. Id. at 2255 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
246. See id. at 2256.
247. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 251; see supra notes 203-17 and accompanying
text (comparing tort remedies and regulatory remedies).
safety regulations, pre-emption does not further policy goals because of
their complimentary nature."'
Throughout the Medtronic opinion, the Court wove in its concern for
the health and safety of the individual." Particularly telling, the Court
dismissed Medtronic's contention that Congress intended to protect the
entire public by removing obstacles, such as state tort liability, hinder-
ing the research, development, and production of lifesaving medical
devices."n While protecting individuals rather than groups conforms
with general notions of American jurisprudence, the Court appears to
have overlooked the tremendous public benefit gleaned from advances
in the medical devices field.26' Under the particular circumstances of
the Medtronic case, the Court's individualistic view of public health and
safety could have a devastating effect on the medical devices industry
and, in turn, on the public at large.2 2
5. Compensation
Contemporary principles on compensation contend that manufactur-
ers will be deterred from producing unsafe products if the possible
financial harm outweighs the possible gain.2" Furthermore, compensa-
tion should be targeted at the individual or entity in the best position to
spread the risk.25 While state tort remedies and regulatory schemes
both aim at deterring injurious conduct, only tort law shifts the risks to
the manufacturers who are able to spread the losses among a large
consumer population.25 Thus, under the loss-spreading rationale sup-
porting state tort claims, the public policy of compensation disfavors
pre-emption which would otherwise "immunize[] manufacturers from
liability."125
248. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 251.
249. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2252-59.
250. See id. at 2253.
251. See supra notes 51-71 and accompanying text (discussing the history of medi-
cal devices and their regulation).
252. See supra notes 203-17 and accompanying text (comparing the impact of tort
liability and FDA regulation on the development of medical devices).
253. See Ausness, supra note 200, at 251-52 (defining the principle as "corrective
justice").
254. See id. (defining the principle as "utilitarian-based theories of risk distribu-
tion").
255. See id. (noting that although individuals can spread the risk through insurance,
manufacturers can spread the loss more efficiently).
256. See id. at 252 (postulating that "pre-emption forces the victim, rather than the
manufacturer, to bear the personal injury loss, even though the manufacturer could
include the loss as a cost of production").
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In Medtronic, the Court found that "[t]he presence of a damages
remedy does not amount to the additional or different 'requirement'
that is necessary under the statute; rather, it merely provides another
reason for manufacturers to comply with identical existing
'requirements' under federal law."" 7 Additionally, the Court concluded
that some tort claims do not interfere with the FDA requirements.2"
Accordingly, the Court's holding implicitly supports the compensation
principle disfavoring pre-emption of state tort claims.
In sum, the Supreme Court implicitly found that the policy concerns
of interstate commerce, federalism, agency decisionmaldng, consumer
safety, and compensation support a finding rejecting federal pre-emp-
tion under the MDA."9
VI. CONCLUSION
Little did Lora Lohr know that when her Medtronic pacemaker failed
sending her into cardiac arrest her story would some day be told before
the United States Supreme Court." Yet her story would settle the
long-disputed issue of whether the Medical Device Amendments pre-
empt state tort actions. In the end, a plurality of the Supreme Court
Justices found that Congress did not intend for the MDA to pre-empt
state tort claims.26 '
The Medtronic decision may have immediate and far reaching effects
on the medical devices industry. The six cases that were remanded to
the courts of appeals will undoubtedly send shockwaves through the
medical devices industry.2 Medtronic, however, also clarifies the of-
ten elusive and confusing rationale of the Court's pre-emption deci-
sions. A probing examination of the Court's opinion reveals that the
apparent focus on statutory interpretation belies the deeper constitu-
tional and policy considerations at work. This Note concludes that, in
fact, the Court implicitly considered the broader policy concerns of
interstate commerce, federalism, agency decisionmaking, consumer
257. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 116 S. Ct. 2240, 2255 (1996).
258. See id. at 2258.
259. See id. at 2259; Ausness, supra note 200, at 244-45 (defining five policy consid-
erations inevitable in statutory interpretation).
260. See Medtronic, 116 S. Ct. at 2245.
261. See id. at 2259.
262. See supra notes 198, 203-17 and accompanying text (discussing the possible
impact of the Medtronic decision on the medical device industry).
safety, and compensation in its pre-emption analysis.2" Therefore,
what appeared to be a result-oriented pre-emption decision may rather
signal a new era of constitutional analysis.
MARK E. GELSINGER
263. See supra notes 218-63 and accompanying text (discussing the unstated consti-
tutional forces favoring pre-emption as the basis of rendering a decision).
